Notes
Page 35 of 42
1 The narrow approach to interpreting the basic right to use either English or French before the courts (in cases where the right applies) is found in: MacDonald v. City of Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460; Bilodeau v. Attorney General (Manitoba), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449; Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau Brunswick v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549.
2 The basic right originates in section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867. With respect to the courts of Manitoba see section 23 of the Manitoba Act (1870), S.C. 1870, c.3. With respect to New Brunswick see subsection 19(2) of the Charter, adopted in 1982; Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3 The specific issues before the Supreme Court concerned the legal validity of unilingual summonses issued under the authority of courts before which both English and French were constitutionally protected, and whether the right to use either language included the right to be heard and understood directly by a judge in the chosen language.
4 MacDonald, supra, note 1, at p. 496.
5 Société des Acadiens, supra, note 1, at p. 578.
6 In particular see: Mahé v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 212; Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839.
7 R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768.
8 In this regard it cited: Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (Blaikie No. 1) and [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312 (Blaikie No. 2).
9 These principles were developed in Mahé and in Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), supra, note 6. They are reproduced in the Beaulac decision at para. 19.
10 “Though constitutional language rights result from a political compromise, this is not a characteristic that uniquely applies to such rights. A. Riddell ... underlines that a political compromise also led to the adoption of ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and argues ... that there is no basis in the constitutional history of Canada for holding that any such political compromises require a restrictive interpretation of constitutional guarantees. I agree that the existence of a political compromise is without consequence with regard to the scope of language rights.” Supra, note 7, at p. 790.
11 Supra, note 7, at pp. 790-791. The Court also pointed out that section 2 of the OLA has the same effect regarding rights established under that Act.
