Memorandum of Argument of the Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada before the Court of Appeal
| C A N A D A PROVINCE OF QUEBEC S.C.: 500-05-062138-001 C.A.: 500-09-011214-012 | C O U R T OF A P P E A L __________________________
APPELLANT/Intervener v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC ET AL. RESPONDENT/Defendant and CITY OF WESTMOUNT ET AL. MISES-EN-CAUSE/Plaintiffs and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ET AL. MIS-EN-CAUSE/Mis-en-cause |
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES FOR CANADA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I – FACTS
1. The Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada (the “Commissioner”) appeals the decision of the Honourable Justice Maurice Lagacé, J.C.S., dated June 28, 2001, dismissing the Commissioner’s intervention in the Court below.
2. The proceedings in the Court below challenged the validity of certain provisions in Bills 170 and 171, enacted by the National Assembly of Quebec in December 2000.
Bill 170, An Act to reform the municipal territorial organization of the metropolitan regions of Montréal, Québec and Outaouais (S.Q. 2000, c. 56) (“Bill 170”)
Bill 171, An Act to amend the Charter of the French Language (S.Q. 2000, c. 57) (“Bill 171”)
3. The Commissioner’s intervention in those proceedings was limited to contesting the constitutional validity of section 6 of Bill 171, which introduced more stringent threshold criteria to be met thereafter by a municipality or borough in order to obtain bilingual recognition. The Commissioner argued that in the result, the rights and benefits enjoyed by the English-speaking minority in Quebec had been reduced in violation of section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Canadian Charter”).
4. It should be noted that the Commissioner’s intervention in no way questioned the principles underlying the Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., c. C-11, or the efforts of the Quebec National Assembly to promote the advancement and the development of the French language in the province of Quebec, and in that respect endorsed the finding of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Ford decision that:
“.. the aim of the language policy underlying the Charter of the French Language was a serious and legitimate one. [The evidence indicates] the concern about the survival of the French language and the perceived need for an adequate legislative response to the problem. Moreover, [the evidence indicates] a rational connection between protecting the French language and assuring that the reality of Quebec society is communicated through the visage linguistique.”
Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 778-79
5. The Court below rejected the Commissioner’s arguments, finding that no linguistic right is guaranteed by section 16(3), and section 16(3) cannot be applied to invalidate a law enacted by the legislature within its field of legislative jurisdiction.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 141
6. Pursuant to section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language, a municipality or a borough may apply to the Office de la langue française for a bilingual recognition provided that it meets the threshold criteria set out in that section.
7. As a general rule, the Charter of the French Language says that a municipality or borough’s language of work must be French and that all internal communications and certain external communications may only be in French. However, if a municipality or borough has been recognized as bilingual pursuant to section 29.1, it has the right to conduct internal communications in English (in addition to French), to have the municipal or borough name in English (in addition to French), to have signs and posters in English (in addition to French), and its employees have the right to work in English.
Charter of the French Language, Chapter IV (“The Language of Civil Administration”)
8. Before the Bill 171 amendments, bilingual recognition of a municipality pursuant to section 29.1 required a majority of residents speaking a language other than French. After the amendments, bilingual recognition requires a majority of residents that have English as their mother-tongue. The threshold criteria for bilingual recognition remained unchanged in respect of educational, health, and social services institutions.
9. For the purposes of the Commissioner’s appeal, the key findings of fact by the Court below were that:
- the new threshold criteria of “English mother tongue” will apply to the existing bilingual boroughs in the event of an application to withdraw that bilingual status. In the result, bilingual status will be withdrawn more easily;
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 175
and
- there was no pressing need for the linguistic provisions introduced by Bill 171, and those provisions do not in any way further the project of municipal reorganisation.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraphs 164 and 166
10. With respect to the interpretation of linguistic rights, the Court below held that:
- linguistic rights are to be interpreted restrictively in accordance with the 1986 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Société des Acadiens v. Parents for Fairness, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460. The Court below stated:
[TRANSLATION] “Some of the applicants invite the Court to depart from the “restrictive” interpretation of language rights adopted by Justice Beetz in Société des Acadiens in favour of Justice Bastarache’s “new” rule of interpretation in R. v. Beaulac
Reasons for Judgment, note 124 (at page 71)
[1999], 1 S.C.R. 768, para. 25. With respect, this decision can be distinguished to the extent that it deals with a specific criminal procedure (based on section 530 of the Criminal Code). Justice Bastarache’s position on this issue was the subject of a dissenting opinion rendered by Justices Lamer and Binnie (pp. 775-777). This Court favours the latter approach, in light of the rule of prudence consistently recognized by the Supreme Court in matters of the interpretation of language rights.”
and
- given their origins in political compromise, language rights are anchored in explicit text.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 148
11. With respect to the interpretation and application of section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter, the Court below held that:
- the text of section 16 of the Canadian Charter provides a limited “code” of rights (un “code”+ défini de droits) that can only be added to by means of a constitutional amendment such as the 1993 New Brunswick amendment (section 16.1);
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 143
- the principle of advancement towards the equality of status and use of the two official languages in section 16 is a political principle that, in and of itself, creates no linguistic right or obligation. It is no more than an invitation to improve institutional bilingualism in the provinces other than New Brunswick;
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 136
- if the linguistic benefits arising from section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language were protected by section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter, this would amount to a constitutionalisation of section 29.1;
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 142
and
- section 16(3) confers no language right and cannot invalidate legislation otherwise enacted within the limits of the province’s constitutional authority.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 141
12. The Quebec Attorney General argued in the Court below that a constitutional amendment had been necessary in 1993 in order to guarantee New Brunswick’s two official language communities equality of status and rights, and the right to those distinct cultural and educational institutions necessary to the protection and advancement of those communities. The Court below appeared to accept this argument.
Réponse du Procureur général du Québec au Mémoire de la Commissaire aux langues officielles du Canada, May 25, 2001, at page 11, lines 7 to 12
Reasons for Judgment, paragraphs 143 and 144
13. With respect to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Court below held that:
- section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 confers unlimited legislative authority on the provinces with respect to municipal institutions (le pouvoir illimité du législateur sur les institutions municipales);
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph paragraph 187
and
- if the decision of a court prevents the exercise of a legislative power conferred by the Constitution, the court has at the same time removed that power.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 100
14. With respect to sections 23 to 28 of the Charter of the French Language, the Court below found that bilingual recognition pursuant to section 29.1 of the Charte de la langue française does not entail any right to bilingual services.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 179
15. With respect to the constitutional validity of section 6 of Bill 171, the Court below found that section 6 of Bill 171 was enacted within the limits of provincial authority, and cannot be rendered invalid by virtue of section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter.
Reasons for Judgment, paragraph 141
PART II – QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL
16. The Commissioner’s argument and grounds of appeal are limited to those matters bearing directly upon her argument before the Court below that section 6 of Bill 171 is unconstitutional because of its inconsistency with section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter. The Commissioner will present as her grounds for appeal the following errors committed by the Court below:
- that the Court below erred in law in finding that language rights are to be subjected to a rule of restrictive interpretation.
The Commissioner will argue that language rights must in all cases be given a broad and purposive interpretation, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada, and that this rule applies notwithstanding the origins of language rights in political compromise;
- that the Court below erred in law in finding that paragraph 16(3) of the Canadian Charter provides no protection to official language communities.
The Commissioner will argue that section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter embodies the principle of advancement of Canada’s official language communities towards substantive equality, and protects the minority language communities from a reduction in linguistic rights and benefits in the absence of justification pursuant to section 1 of the same Charter;
- that the Court below erred in law in finding that sections 23 to 28 of the Charter of the French Language confer no right to obtain municipal services in English on the residents of municipalities or boroughs recognised as “bilingual” pursuant to section 29.1 of the same Act.
The Commissioner will argue that in the event that a municipality or borough has been recognised as “bilingual” pursuant to section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language, sections 23 to 28 confer certain rights and benefits on members of the minority English-speaking community in Quebec, including access to English-language municipal services; and
- that the Court below erred in concluding that section 6 of Bill 171, amending section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language, was valid legislation consistent with the linguistic guarantees and protections of the Canadian Constitution.
The Commissioner will argue that section 6 of Bill 171 introduced more stringent criteria to be met by a municipality or borough in order to obtain bilingual status. Since it is now more difficult to obtain a bilingual designation, and the designation can be more easily withdrawn, it follows that the minority English-speaking community’s access to the rights and benefits resulting from a bilingual designation has been reduced accordingly. Such reduction in minority language rights and benefits is in contravention of section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter and has not been justified pursuant to section 1.
PART III – ARGUMENT
A. The Interpretation of Constitutional Language Rights17. The fundamental rules governing the interpretation of constitutional provisions apply equally to the interpretation of constitutional provisions addressing language rights. Those fundamental rules include:
- constitutional provisions are to be subject to a broad and purposive interpretation;
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344
and
- constitutional provisions are to be interpreted in light of the fundamental unwritten principles underlying the Constitution, including the principle of the protection of minorities.
Reference re the Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at paras. 32 and 79 to 82
18. The identification of the objects or purposes of constitutional provisions through textual interpretation, and the identification of the resulting rights and legal obligations and the role of our political institutions, are assisted by referring to those unwritten constitutional principles, including the principle of the protection of minorities.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra. at para. 52
19. In addition to such general rules of constitutional interpretation, a particular rule applies when the subject matter is language rights. In R. v. Beaulac decision, the Supreme Court of Canada establishes clearly and unequivocally that language rights “must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada,” notwithstanding the origin of such rights in political compromise. It must be noted that the majority decision in Beaulac explicitly rejects Société des Acadiens and the restrictive interpretative rule for which that decision stood. This majority position has since been affirmed unanimously by the Supreme Court in the Arsenault Cameron decision.
R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 at para. 25 (emphasis per original)
See also: Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3; and Mahé v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342
20. Thus, the explicit dismissal of the Beaulac decision by the Court below, and of the interpretive rule for which that decision stands, constitute a fundamental error of law undermining the whole of the decision rejecting the Commissioner’s intervention.
B. Section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms21. Section 16 of the Canadian Charter states:
16. (1) English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
(2) English and French are the official languages of New Brunswick and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the legislature and government of New Brunswick.
(3) Nothing in this Charter limits the authority of Parliament or a legislature to advance the equality of status or use of English and French.
22. As stated clearly by the Supreme Court of Canada, the purpose of language rights is “to protect official language minorities in this country and to insure the equality of status of French and English.”
Beaulac, supra. at para. 41
23. Given the purpose of language rights, it is submitted that section 16 of the Canadian Charter is built upon three fundamental principles:
- the substantive equality of constitutional language rights;
- the advancement toward equality of English and French; and
- the protection of and respect for official language minority communities;
R. v. Beaulac, supra at para. 24 (for the first two principles)
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra. at para. 52 (for the last principle)
24. In light of the purpose of section 16 and its fundamental underlying principles, the Commissioner submits that section 16(3) embodies the commitment of the federal and provincial governments to take measures that advance the equality of the official language communities. Similarly, given section 16’s purpose and the constitutional principle of the protection of minorities, the Commissioner submits that section 16(3) also offers protection to the official language communities.
25. Any measure reducing the rights or benefits enjoyed by the members of an official language community would be fundamentally incompatible with section 16(3)’s commitment to the advancement and development of that community. Therefore, should a legislature exercise its powers with respect to a linguistic minority, those powers may then only be exercised in a manner not unfavourable to that minority.
26. Logically, therefore, section 16(3) protects the linguistic minority against a diminishment of its rights, absent justification of the government’s or legislature’s actions pursuant to section 1 of the Canadian Charter.
27. Similarly, it has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada that in the event that a government elects to confer a benefit, the government must ensure that it has done so in a manner consistent with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution:
“[....] While s. 2(b) of the Charter does not include the rights to any particular means of expression, where a government chooses to provide one, it must do so in a fashion that is consistent with the Constitution. The traditional rules of Charter scrutiny continue to apply. [....]”
Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 at 1041, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.
28. Therefore, having explicitly discarded the rule requiring a purposive interpretation of language rights consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada, and in the result selecting and applying a restrictive interpretation of section 16(3), the Court below erred fundamentally in law.
29. Certain other errors of law revealed by the Reasons for Judgment fundamentally undermined the decision rendered, in that such errors of law fatally compromised the analytical framework established and applied by the Court below in drawing its conclusions. In particular, the Court below erred in law in finding that:
- section 16.1 of the Canadian Charter (the 1993 New Brunswick Amendment) is relevant to and confirms a restrictive interpretation of section 16(3);
- if section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter protected the language rights and benefits resulting from section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language (as argued by the Commissioner), this would be the same as constitutional entrenchment of section 29.1; and
- section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 confers unlimited legislative authority in respect of municipal institutions on the provinces, so that any limitation imposed by the Courts on section 92(8) would entail annulment of the jurisdiction conferred by section 92(8).
i) Section 16.1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 1993 New Brunswick Amendment)
30. Contrary to the submissions of the Attorney General of Quebec at trial, it is submitted that section 16.1 of the Canadian Charter has no relevance to the question whether section 16(3) provides protection to existing linguistic rights.
31. Section 16.1 of the Canadian Charter explicitly guarantees distinct institutions to New Brunswick’s official language communities “including educational and cultural institutions” and explicitly constitutionalizes that particular provincial government’s obligation to preserve and promote the status, rights and privileges of each official language community.
32. It appears that the Court below accepted the argument of the Attorney General of Quebec proposition that since section 16.1 was added to the Canadian Charter in 1993, therefore a constitutional obligation to protect the advancement of official language communities cannot also be grounded in section 16(3). The essence of this argument is that there can be no overlap of linguistic guarantees between section 16.1 and 16(3); therefore, since section 16.1 provides constitutional protection to the two official language communities, protects advancement section 16(3) cannot do the same.
33. The Supreme Court of Canada has established the interpretive rule that applies in the event of conflict between rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter. According to the Court, “[a] hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be avoided....”
Dagenais v. C.B.C., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 877 per Lamer C.J.C., cited with approval in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at 713-4 per McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ.
34. If one Charter-guaranteed right cannot override another in the event of actual conflict, then in the case of an apparent overlap between rights the same principle applies with even greater force. It follows that sections 16(3) and 16.1 of the Canadian Charter must be interpreted according to their respective objectives in a manner that fully respects the importance of the rights they are meant to protect.
Cf. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 833-834 per McLachlin J.
ii) Constitutional Protection Pursuant to Section 16(3) vs. Constitutional Entrenchment
35. It is submitted that the protection of existing language rights by section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter is clearly distinguishable from a constitutional entrenchment of the legislation giving rise to those same language rights.
36. Any legislative measures that advance the official language communities are protected by section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter. Such measures may subsequently be diminished or abolished, but only in accordance with section 1. In comparison, if the same legislative measures were entrenched in the Canadian Charter they could only be altered or abolished by constitutional amendment.
37. Therefore, the Court below erred in law in concluding that if section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter protected the rights and benefits resulting from section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language, that result would be equivalent to a constitutional entrenchment of section 29.1. The Court below erred further in relying on this conclusion to justify a restrictive interpretation of section 16(3).
iii) Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867
38. It is submitted that the legislative authority granted to the provinces pursuant to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 is exclusive, in that the federal parliament is thereby precluded from legislating in relation to municipal institutions. It does not follow, however, that such exclusive authority is also unlimited. Rather, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Vriend v. Alberta decision, that legislative authority is constrained by the Constitution as a whole:
It is suggested that this appeal represents a contest between the power of the democratically elected legislatures to pass the laws they see fit, and the power of the courts to disallow those laws, or to dictate that certain matters be included in those laws. To put the issue in this way is misleading and erroneous. Quite simply, it is not the courts which limit the legislatures. Rather, it is the Constitution, which must be interpreted by the courts, that limits the legislatures. [....]
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at para. 56 (per Cory and Iacobucci JJ.)
39. The Court below also erred in its conclusion that any restriction imposed on the exercise of legislative authority pursuant to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 must be considered a denial or annulment of that legislative authority. Rather, the distinction between curtailing and removing a legislative power is as follows:
The role of the Charter is not envisaged in our jurisprudence as providing for the automatic repeal of any provisions of the Constitution of Canada .... Action taken under the Constitution Act, 1867 is of course subject to Charter review. That is a far different thing from saying that a specific power to legislate as existing prior to April 1982 has been entirely removed by the simple advent of the Charter. It is one thing to supervise and on a proper occasion to curtail the exercise of a power to legislate; it is quite another thing to say that an entire power to legislate has been removed from the Constitution by the introduction of this judicial power of supervision. [....]
Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 at 1206-07, per Estey J.
40. In conclusion, the Commissioner submits that section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter embodies the principle of advancement of Canada’s official language communities towards substantive equality. Section 16(3) protects the minority language communities from a reduction in linguistic rights and benefits in the absence of justification pursuant to section 1 of the same Charter. This interpretation of section 16(3) is entirely consistent with the 1993 New Brunswick amendment, and with the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the provinces by virtue of section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Moreover, in its protection of existing linguistic rights and benefits, section 16(3) does not effectively entrench the legislative source of those linguistic rights and benefits.
C. Rights and Benefits Resulting from a “Bilingual Designation” pursuant to section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language41. The National Assembly of Québec has expressly recognised that in the pursuit of its goal of assuring the quality and influence of the French language, it intends to act, inter alia:
“...in a spirit of fairness and open-mindedness, respectful of the institutions of the English-speaking community of Québec... whose valuable contribution to the development of Québec it readily acknowledges;”
Charter of the French Language, supra preamble
42. The rights and benefits that result from a “bilingual” designation pursuant to section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language are the exception to the general rule of French only that applies to municipal administration. The rights are conferred explicitly upon the designated municipality or borough and its English-speaking employees and administrators.
Charter of the French Language, supra sections 23 to 29.1
43. It is submitted that the rights that accrue to a borough or municipality from a “bilingual” designation — namely to erect signs or posters including English, to make English part of its name, and to conduct internal communications in English in addition to French — are exercised to and for the benefit of the minority English-speaking community.
44. Similarly, it is submitted that the rights that accrue to the employees of a borough or municipality with a bilingual designation “namely to work and communicate internally in English” operate as well to the benefit of the minority English-speaking community.
45. In short, as a matter of logic, it follows that where the employees and internal administration of a municipality or borough function in English, this facilitates communication with the public about municipal services, in English, and the provision of those services to the public, in English.
46. It is submitted therefore that, at a minimum, the practical consequence of a bilingual designation of a municipality or borough is to confer a right to receive municipal services in English upon the English-speaking residents of such municipality or borough.
47. In the alternative, it is submitted that whether the resulting ability to receive municipal services in English is characterised as a right, or as a benefit, the receipt of municipal services in English contributes to the vitality and well-being of the minority English-language community, and is protected by section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter.
D. Section 6 of Bill 171 Violates Section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms48. It is submitted that the amendment of section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language by section 6 of Bill 171:
- reduced the ability of municipalities or boroughs to obtain “bilingual” recognition pursuant to section 29.1;
- increased the likelihood of the withdrawal of “bilingual” status from municipalities and boroughs so designated; and
- thereby reduced the ability of the English-speaking employees of such municipalities or boroughs, and members of the minority English-speaking community, to benefit from such bilingual designations.
49. Nonetheless, there was no evidence submitted to the Court below to justify the reduction in rights and benefits enjoyed by the English-speaking community as a consequence of a “bilingual” designation.
50. Moreover, the Court below concluded that the legislative provision amending section 29.1 of the Charter of the French Language was unnecessary to the project of municipal reorganisations.
51. It is submitted therefore that section 6 of Bill 171 is inconsistent with section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter, that justification of such inconsistency was and has not been demonstrated pursuant to section 1 of the Canadian Charter, and that, therefore, section 6 of Bill 171 is of no force or effect by virtue of section 52 of the Canadian Charter.
PART IV – CONCLUSIONS
52. In light of the foregoing, and such other arguments as may be advanced at the hearing of this appeal, the Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada respectfully requests that this Honourable Court
REVERSE the decision of the Honourable Justice Maurice Lagacé, of the Superior Court, with respect to the Commissioner's intervention, and
DECLARE that Section 6 of Bill 171 violates of Section 16(3) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore is of no force or effect to the extent of such inconsistency pursuant to section 52 of the same Charter.
THE WHOLE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
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PART V – AUTHORITIES
| PAGE(S) | |
| Bill 170, An Act to reform the municipal territorial organization of the metropolitan regions of Montréal, Québec and Outaouais (S.Q. 2000, c. 56) | 2 |
| Bill 171, An Act to amend the Charter of the French Language (S.Q. 2000, c. 57) | 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16 |
| Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part I of the Constitution Act of 1982 | 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 |
| Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., c. C-11 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 |
| Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 | 2 |
| Société des Acadiens v. Parents for Fairness, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460 | 3, 9 |
| R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 at para. 25 | 9, 10 |
| Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 | 5, 11, 13, 14 |
| R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344 | 8 |
| Reference re the Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 | 8, 10 |
| Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3 | 9 |
| Mahé v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 | 9 |
| Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 | 10 |
| Dagenais v. C.B.C., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 | 12 |
| R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 | 12 |
| R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 | 12 |
| Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 | 13 |
| Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), | 13 |
